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Finding the archaeological precedents of what 
has been labelled ‘Italian neorealist architecture’ 
is perhaps too easy an endeavour, as the Italian 
historian Manfredo Tafuri recalls.1 According to 
Tafuri, the precedents for this kind of architecture 
that blossomed right after World War II, were the 
rural exhibitions promoted by the fascist regime. 
These created a common stratum for disenchanted 
intellectuals, working classes, and the peasantry 
alike, well before the beginning of the international 
hostilities. To trace the natural, rural, or popular 
influences in a country that had only recently 
accomplished full industrialisation and was still 
dependent on a strong agricultural sector, seems 
not too much of a challenge. Nonetheless, some 
conditions may also be highlighted: a whole array of 
political, ideological, and economic factors contrib-
uted to that redemptive communion in an amalgam 
of agents that inevitably affected the architectural 
debates. In 1936, the official adoption by the fascist 
regime of policies promoting autarky2 - a national 
economic doctrine that relies on domestic material 
disposal and manufacturing in order to guarantee 
economic independence - did not just provide 
significant direction for the architectural use of 
national materials. It also brought forward austerity 
as a fundamental guiding concept for a sector that 
was not considered as strategic in terms of warfare. 
From the 1930s until the end of World War II, the 
government promoted, by means of indoctrination 
campaigns, the intensive use and research of 
domestically produced materials over imported 
ones. The architectural consequences of the search 
for economic autonomy in an increasingly unsteady 
international environment would play a fundamental 
role in the development of Italian postwar architec-
ture. Architects with affinities to the fascist regime 
took advantage of the economic restrictions to 
defend the use of Italian materials while promoting 
monumentality to represent the official architecture 
of the regime. But also the architects less committed 
to Mussolini’s regime defended austerity, as a way 
to support the ideological basis and possibilities of 
the modern movement. The tendentious reading 
of interwar political interests triggered numerous 
social, industrial and architectural reactions that 
provided a productive substratum for postwar 
architecture. After World War II, austerity became 
the main semantic assistance for the Roman archi-
tectural elite to engage with the reconstruction tasks 
and accommodate the huge immigration movement 
from the agricultural fields towards urban centres. 
The present article will explore some of the 
material, industrial, and ideological developments 
that were already present before World War II and 
cannot be overlooked in the analysis of postwar 
architecture. The intent is not to propose a cultural 
revision of that period, but to acknowledge the 
reception and establishment of material policies in 
architectural discipline and debate from 1936 until 
the reconstruction years. Autarchic policies became 
a recurrent agent in time, interacting with different 
cultural (the presence of the avant-garde and the 
re-evaluation of the modern movement), social 
(peasantry and immigrations towards urban areas), 
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technologies that required investments and instead 
opted for technologies that allowed the exploitation 
of the available mass of unskilled labourers. The 
major businesses emerging after reunification - 
companies that would later play a fundamental role 
in Italian mass production, such as Pirelli (1872), 
Fiat (1899), or Olivetti (1908) - were founded on 
familiar oligarchies, but were also sponsored by 
(both leftist and conservative) public authorities, and 
financed by a banking system of German origins, 
such as Credito Italiano and Banca Commerciale 
(1894). Italy would thus enter the twentieth century 
as a hybrid capitalist state, based on both public 
and private capital resources.3
Italian industrialisation switched gears thanks to 
hydroelectric power and the surplus of agricultural 
labour migrating to wealthier areas in the north, 
such as Milan or Turin. This exodus resulted, after 
World War II, in the emergence of a huge gamut 
of small businesses or laboratori: companies with 
a combination of technical and craftsmanship 
knowledge able to nourish each other materially. 
The economic historian Vera Zamagni has argued 
that industrialisation in Italy was faster and more 
successful precisely in those places where the 
relationship between the peasantry and the manu-
facturers was closer.4 Social aspects, such as 
familial concentration, and neighbourhood and 
community values, helped blur the line between 
manufacturers and workshops, a strategy that had 
no counterpart in Europe. In fact, the capabilities, 
flexibility, and independence of Italian manufactur-
ers from the government and public sponsorship, 
as well as the atomisation of its economy in multiple 
small-scale companies, would become the corner-
stone of Italian production, allowing it to face the 
challenges of the first half of the twentieth century. 
Italy was thus a country of small- and medium-sized 
businesses, partly as a result of its craftsman herit-
age but also due to the limited size of its market and 
economy.
ideological (the fascist regime and its opposition), 
and productive forces (the relationship between 
industry and craftsmanship) before World War II. 
Without overestimating its relevance, austerity can 
be identified as a semantic offspring of material 
policies, articulating a multiplicity of agents in archi-
tectural practice. As such, it becomes a valuable 
tool for reading and interpreting the difficult and 
intricate interactions between economic contingen-
cies and architectural production. Pre- and postwar 
Italy serves as a particularly appropriate case for 
comprehending such entanglements. The interplay 
between social categories and productive forces, 
on the one hand, and history and ideology, on the 
other, within a precise cultural milieu, encourages a 
contingent historical reading of architectural devel-
opments, rather than a teleological one.  
1 - Precedents
Any evaluation of the presence and development of 
the modern movement in different countries before 
and after World War II must take into account the 
level of industrialisation of the economy and its 
material possibilities in a given cultural and social 
environment. Avant-garde European architecture 
had been connected to the metaphoric representa-
tion of the industrial machine. Notwithstanding its 
Futurist movement, Italy witnessed a relatively slow 
industrialisation after its 1870 reunification. The 
cultural ambitions of the bourgeoisie were belatedly 
incorporated into the national cultural agenda, and 
therefore the Liberty Style - also called Floreale - 
would be less agile than its European counterparts. 
Even though recent studies of nineteenth-century 
Italian industry tend to demonstrate that its back-
wardness was not as extreme as was suggested 
by the data published by the Istituto nazionale di 
statistica during the 1950s, Italian industrial devel-
opment was without doubt incomparable to the 
achievements of its European neighbours. In order 
to accommodate for the nation’s socio-economic 
reality, Italian industrialists were reluctant to import 
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material weakness. Thus, autarchic measures were 
considered a double failure, neither able to guarantee 
the military power that Mussolini needed to engage 
in the dispute, nor to launch a powerful industrial 
productive force. Nonetheless, if the fascist regime 
did not bridge its technological gap with surrounding 
nations, it did not hamper industrial progress either. 
The imperial aspirations of Mussolini fuelled new 
political agreements that influenced postwar devel-
opments, notably the initiatives around the chemical 
industries, which were paramount in the fabrication 
of explosives, artificial textiles (e.g. rubber), and the 
development and exploitation of aluminium.
2 - Autarky and industrial policy
In 1933, the Istituto per la ricostruzione industriale 
(IRI) was founded to undertake strategic control 
of industry. After the crisis in the beginning of the 
decade, the IRI took control of steel production, 
favouring, for instance, the use of scraps as a way to 
counteract the scarcity of raw material. At that time, 
Italy became the main importing country of scraps in 
the world, amounting to one-third of the total output 
between 1920 and 1936. Despite those efforts, the 
price of steel products in Italy was up to three times 
the value in other countries because of inefficient 
coordination of the overall metal production. During 
the second half of the 1930s, engineering would 
demand the larger amount of iron, whereas the use 
of steel in construction diminished.7
The military invasion of Ethiopia on 3 October 
1935 by Mussolini’s fascist regime had considerable 
consequences for its imperialistic and economic 
aims. Four days after the conquest, the Society of 
Nations imposed economic sanctions,8 denouncing 
the Italian act as a declaration of war against all 
members of the Society, according to previously 
signed agreements. The intensification of Italian 
economic autonomy was a direct consequence of 
those events.
Even though the international blockade did not 
The biennio rosso (1919-1920) was character-
ised by worker upheavals and popular calls for a 
redistribution of wealth. This led to high inflation 
and rampant unemployment, which in turn allowed 
for the political rise of the Fasci di combattimento, 
founded by Mussolini in March 1919. Mussolini’s 
arrival to power in 1922 did not result in substantial 
economic changes until the official declaration of 
the dictatorship three years later. The government 
addressed the pressing problems of monetary 
policy and inflation through the application of initially 
liberal strategies that soon became interventionist. 
With public interventions and the nationalisation of 
key sectors, such as the banking system, the state 
began to take over the economy and industry. It 
also launched new production policies as a way 
to guarantee the economic independence of the 
nation. The aftermath of those policies in the devel-
opment of Italian industry has been disputed. Some 
economists and historians have read the period 
as an obstacle to Italian technological growth. 
Others instead have argued that the combination 
of the sponsorship of small- and medium-sized 
manufacturers, the encouragement of material 
research, and the defence of domestic production 
were foundational to the ‘Italian economic miracle’ 
of the 1960s. 
The final aims of the fascist regime are less 
disputed than its policies. It is verifiable that the 
priority was to transform the nation into a war 
machine, despite the scarcity of products and even 
though downsized opportunities abroad hindered 
industrial production. The domestic output was only 
able to provide one-fifth of the material needs of 
the country. Few scholars understand the autarchic 
statements as an advantage for later technological 
development.5 The result was that Italian imports 
between 1936 and 1938 were half the level of 
1913.6 The situation was such that Italy was forced 
to sell weaponry to those countries already at war 
with Germany, disavowing the needs of its ally and 
delaying its participation in the conflict due to its 
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cated reports for outside consumption become a 
key source for political continuity. It was in that spirit 
that, in 1938, the Istituto per gli studi di politica inter-
nazionale in Milan published a document written in 
English, titled Autarchy, meant to justify the actions 
taken within the turbulent and uncertain atmos-
phere between nations in the 1930s. Autarky was 
portrayed as the most compelling but also inevitable 
solution to safeguard Italian interests. But autarchic 
policies had more ambitious aims beyond economic 
self-maintenance. The policy was presented as a 
manoeuvre of national reaffirmation to guarantee its 
political autonomy:  
The essential character of autarchic policies cannot 
be explained by merely showing the connection 
between the tendency to secure greater self-suffi-
ciency shown by all countries and the postwar trend 
toward a planned economy. The real explanation is 
to be found in the fact that all efforts at economic 
self-sufficiency aim not only at satisfying economic 
needs but at securing national political independ-
ence. It is only when the connection between 
economic and political needs is understood that 
autarchic policies become comprehensible.11
Liberating the government from foreign dependence 
would jettison unwanted political chains, allowing 
Mussolini to proceed according to his own agenda. 
The Italian dictatorship was therefore shielded 
behind the tendency among industrialised nations 
to protect their market after the Great Depression, 
regardless of the agreements of liberalism signed in 
previous years. The movements made by Germany 
and followed by Italy in that direction were manda-
tory, according to the Italian pamphlet, both to 
guarantee and safeguard their political integrity and 
to justify the otherwise unacceptable invasions.
This new international situation forced the govern-
ment to evaluate its domestic material disposal and 
to reconsider its industrial organisation. In terms of 
energy, the nation struggled to supply sufficient coal 
last long - sanctions ended on 15 July 1936 - the 
government launched a series of measures to 
assuage energy and supply shortages while mobi-
lising national production according to military 
agendas and interests. Among the many obstacles 
the sanctions brought, the lack of coal and iron 
was the most worrisome. Italy was short on natural 
resources to satisfy demand for those materials, 
which were fundamental to meet the needs of the 
army. Moreover, Mussolini’s military aspirations 
relied chiefly on steel production. Thus, the Italian 
government sponsored programs in order to obtain 
not only those raw materials, but also the required 
currencies for international commercial trade. The 
government also promoted small- and medium-
sized companies around industrial districts to 
research and create new materials.
On 23 March 1936 (year XIV according to the 
new fascist calendar that commemorated the rise 
of the movement), Mussolini addressed Italians 
from the Assemblea delle corporazioni, warning 
of the inevitability of war and the need to intensify 
state presence in the market - not to ‘nationalise’, 
or ‘bureaucratise’, but to ‘manage’ and ‘control’ its 
industrial and economic pace.9 As such, the policies 
articulated Italy’s three greatest productive sectors: 
agriculture, small- and medium-sized production, 
and big-factory manufacturing. Mussolini was very 
aware of the role small- and medium-sized compa-
nies based on craftsmanship played for a healthy 
Italian economy. As a result, he dedicated great 
attention to them in his speech, while calling for 
‘initiative’ and ‘individual responsibility’ in order to 
solve common problems.10 The aim was to subor-
dinate and amalgamate private efforts, to defend 
those common targets previously monopolised 
by the fascist state, without jeopardising military 
production.
Propaganda plays a fundamental and obvious 
role in the existential need for control in totalitarian 
states: mass indoctrination and tendentiously fabri-
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to some success in areas like naval construction 
as well as industrial and chemical production. The 
construction industry had to reduce its technological 
aspirations as a result of the material restrictions, 
and instead developed different solutions in tune 
with available resources. 
National and autochthonous values came to the 
forefront, discouraging the use of iron and steel in 
buildings. The use of new and local materials such 
as stone and marble was instead encouraged. 
National wood was used for fibre panels (Faesita, 
Masonita), chipboards (Eraclit, Tekton), or plywood 
(Buxus). Chemical developments contributed to 
new materials such as composite panels (Bakelita), 
while the use of aluminium became comprehensively 
promoted in products such as Duralluminio or Anti-
corodal. Undoubtedly, the material that responded 
better to national directions was glass, with its star 
product Securit appearing in every issue of archi-
tectural magazines. Nevertheless, no remarkable 
glass architecture was developed. Furthermore, to 
succeed in such an economic environment meant 
quite often to highlight the national or autarchic 
character of the material in industrial advertise-
ments. Foreign companies such as Saint-Gobain 
had to emphasise the italianietà of their output in an 
attempt to show acquiescence with governmental 
recommendations.
3 - Autarky and architecture
The architectural discipline and all the industrial 
activity around it suffered from the convoluted 
economic situation, the governmental policies, and 
the scarcity and control of commodities. However, 
the debate around the use of materials in Italian 
architecture had started a few years earlier: 
magazines such as Casabella, Quadrante, and, 
to a lesser extent, Rassegna and Domus, were 
concerned about the relationship between the 
architectural image, the formal language employed, 
and its syntactic articulation, already during the first 
half of the 1930s. In doing so, they foresaw the 
and oil for its domestic market. The government 
naively believed that increasing exploitation and 
availability of coal from mines in Sardinia and Istria 
would be sufficient to safeguard its industrial and 
military development. Unfortunately, Italy could not 
rely solely on its own energy sources. It also had to 
ensure the supply of iron and steel for commodities, 
either by importing, by recycling scraps, or through 
mining exploitation. To follow a policy of imports 
would seriously threaten the autarchic assignment, 
and the reuse of scraps had its obvious limits. The 
problem with the Italian mining industry was that its 
most promising mines were located at an altitude 
of 2.800 meters, hampering not only extraction but 
also manufacture and transportation. Therefore, in 
order to solve the problem, the use of steel and iron 
had to be restricted in those industries that were not 
relevant to military enterprise. However, the great-
est battle to be fought was for the re-education of 
the population and the adaptation of large economic 
sectors to face the complex and delicate economic 
situation:
[...] it is becoming apparent that autarchy not only 
requires the mobilisation of all productive activities 
and the utilisation of the low grade raw materials 
available in the country, it is above all a question 
of ingenuity in discovering new uses for available 
economic resources, and this calls for a radical 
modification of consumer’s tastes, which will be 
secured by the active propaganda carried on in 
favour of economic self-sufficiency. Thus our people 
are learning to eat more fish and less meat, to use 
tinned foods which can be prepared in abundance 
from home grown fruits and vegetables, to reduce 
to a minimum the use of structural steel and iron in 
the building trades, to increase the use of synthetic 
products.12
This educational policy was nevertheless rendered 
partially insufficient. Even though the results of 
autarchic legislation were a resounding failure in 
military terms, the overall production shrinkage led 
26
Bartoli, an engineer and regular contributor to the 
technical section of Casabella, argued that the use 
of steel in buildings was not truly in opposition to 
official policies and recommendations, because a 
closer and more accurate analysis of the meaning 
of autarky would illuminate hidden aspects and 
reverse the conclusions.15 Bartoli affirmed that 
the use of steel in carpentry would be less costly 
than the use of wood because steel was a fully 
industrial, mechanised material, with less labour 
invested in its production. Certainly, one of the most 
pressing needs in interwar Italy in relation to the 
economic blockade was to obtain foreign currency. 
Nevertheless, Bartoli’s argument went a step further 
by pointing out that the equation of autarky and 
austerity was not inevitably the consequence of 
autonomous economic wishes. In addition, Bartoli 
wrote that steel manufactures could enjoy a ‘longer 
life’ because it was feasible to recycle them as 
scraps, while wood could only be used once as an 
energy source. According to that argument, Bartoli 
tacitly assumed the obsolescence and expandabil-
ity of the products as a positive quality, whether or 
not they would later be recycled. This was opposed 
to traditional restoration, reconstruction or simply 
repairing, an issue that Reyner Banham would later 
insist upon with regards to postwar consumerism.16 
During those years, the coupling of autarky and 
austerity was the most frequent argument to defend 
the use of steel.
The resounding responses to Casabella’s 
campaign were just around the corner. In 1938, the 
magazine Rassegna di Architettura founded a series 
of instalments under the heading Tecnica Edile, a 
much more conservative section intended to paral-
lel official positions.17 In the opening article, entitled 
Autarchia nelle Costruzioni Edili, the engineer and 
future minister of labour Giuseppe Gorla asserted 
that the use of metallic materials in construction had 
to be subordinated to military urgency. The prescrip-
tion was to overcome national constraints by 
abolishing the use of metals ‘in the rural and urban 
fundamental critique of rationalism and the artistic 
avant-garde that was about to take place: its inabil-
ity to communicate meaning to a larger segment of 
the population. This critique paralleled the argument 
that Ortega y Gasset launched in 1925 already, 
in The Dehumanization of Art, where he bitterly 
complained about what he called the presumptuous 
and elitist statements of abstract art, insufficiently 
comprehensible to, and compatible with the cultural 
success of future democratic societies.13
One of the main consequences of autarchic 
policies was precisely the rise of a semiotic debate 
centred on the relationship between material and 
its meaning. After stigmatising modern materials 
such as iron or steel, labelled as ‘antinational’, the 
dispute became ideologically loaded between those 
who saw in modern techniques a threat to Italian 
traditional architecture, and those embracing the 
formal and intellectual basis of the modern move-
ment. The magazine Casabella, edited by architect 
Giuseppe Pagano (and Edoardo Persico until his 
death in 1936), initially held an ambiguous position. 
Pagano initially defended the modern use of materi-
als rather than the use of modern materials. But once 
the controversy arose, Casabella’s editor became 
one of the most vociferous defenders of steel as an 
autarchic material, above the official ones like stone 
or clay. It was not just a question of the material 
itself, but rather an attack on those positions that 
could jeopardise the road taken by avant-garde 
architects to this point. In order to settle the editorial 
board’s positions, the magazine launched a series 
of essays in its Sezione Tecnica in the late 1930s, 
aimed to counteract the official recommendations 
against the use of metals, and presenting technical 
knowledge and statistical information that evalu-
ated metals in terms of their desired autonomy from 
foreign markets.14 Nonetheless, defending steel 
from the threat of construction ostracism also meant 
stepping into some paradoxical terrain. It was not 
about consuming less steel but about consuming 
less money to produce those commodities. Ignazio 
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nationalist and populist attitudes.
Piacentini’s positions were supported and 
reinforced by Salvatore Cardella, who in 1939 
published an apologetic article entitled Punti fermi 
della nuova architettura in the magazine Rassegna 
di Architettura.26 The article appropriated Sant’Elia’s 
architectural statements to establish nationalistic 
roots for a ‘new architecture’. Cardella launched a 
vindicatory appraisal of stone, specifically marble, 
as a material belonging to a traditional Italian 
language, for a new monumental architecture meant 
to represent the fascist regime. Unfortunately, this 
new architecture very much resembled the old one. 
According to Pagano, the only space that Piacentini 
and his followers defended was the spurious sphere 
of tradition, a conservative place for fixed values 
and habits that hampered future development of the 
national economy while questioning the industrial 
capabilities of the nation. The problem of a poorly 
understood autarky was its technical and economic 
heritage, as the lack of research in that direction 
would jeopardise new technological developments. 
And so it was.27 In 1940, the year that Casabella 
changed its name to Costruzioni Casabella, 
Giuseppe Pagano criticised the confusing position of 
the state regarding artistic and cultural expressions. 
On the one hand, the state stubbornly defended a 
national monumentality based on artificial myths of 
‘romanity’ as misleading academic paraphrases. 
On the other hand, modern architects were willing 
to find common grounds between ‘art and life, 
technique and feeling, humanity and civilisation, 
between social ideals and artistic primary ones’.28 
Meanwhile, the battle for economic autonomy of the 
fascist government was affecting architecture in two 
different ways: first, by means of the political role 
assigned to architecture and the acknowledgement 
of the paramount relevance it had in fashioning 
the moral habits of populations; and secondly, by 
altering construction procedures and solutions that 
constitute the base of architectural expression.29 
Materials and their technical use have their formal 
modest constructions’.18 Imported wood was also to 
be avoided, as well as coal, while the use of local 
materials was strongly encouraged. Stone stood as 
the chosen material for ‘the works that fascism will 
leave for posterity as a memory of its heroic time’.19 
The aim of the article was to impose a mentality 
that was predisposed towards what Gorla called an 
‘autarchic mystique’, one that worshipped domestic 
and local products above commodities from foreign 
nations.20 This mystique became invested with 
orthodox fascist rhetoric. The exhibition Torino e 
l’autarchia, organised to commemorate the visit of Il 
Duce to the Piemonte in 1939, displayed the glossy 
achievements in economic autonomy of the fascist 
government in areas such as fishery, siderurgy, and 
so on. The exhibition featured an entire pavilion 
devoted to the question of the autarchic mystique, a 
euphemism disguising the indoctrination of govern-
mental spirit. This mystique paralleled the ‘realist 
mystique’ that Salvatore Cardella proposed in the 
same magazine, shortly after Gorla’s indictment.21
Architectural polemics between the defenders of 
the state’s economic and industrial policies on the 
one hand, and the non-conformists on the other, 
reached one of its highest peaks in Giuseppe Paga-
no’s written responses22 to three articles previously 
published by Marcello Piacentini in Giornale d’Italia 
under the unequivocal title Politica dell’Architettura.23 
Piacentini had supported fascist ideological policies 
by advocating the use of marble in monumental 
architecture of pure volumes, very much in tune 
with the government’s taste and its ideal of self-
representation. Even though Piacentini and Pagano 
would agree on rationalistic values of construction, 
simplicity, and structural clarity, the latter could not 
share Piacentini’s defence of l’internazionale clas-
sicoide ed academia, which so much pleased the 
official apparatus.24 The ideological criticism ran 
parallel to the aesthetic one: according to Piacentini, 
among the values of the modern movement was its 
‘adherence to reality’ and natural laws.25 He used 
the term tendentiously to promote and strengthen 
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sentation of pain and sorrow after the massacre.34 
It was in those very first moments that discussions 
of material, its meaning, and its use emerged in the 
different proposals of Roman and Milanese archi-
tects. In 1945 Milan, Ernesto Nathan Rogers, Enrico 
Peresutti, and Ludovico Belgiojoso designed, as a 
memorial for those who had died in Nazi concen-
tration camps, a small Cartesian steel grid based 
on the golden section, holding a vessel full of earth 
from Mauthausen.35 The aesthetic challenge was 
to find agreement through abstract representation. 
The crumbling state of reason left its pristine struc-
ture as a reminder, harbouring the possibility of its 
reconstruction highlighted by a stereotomic absence 
unable to forget history. The materiality of the monu-
ment was not a coincidence: it referred critically to 
an unaccomplished modernity that had to place its 
past in the very ontological centre.36
But whereas the object of the Milanese design 
emphasised the void, in Rome, the memorial of 
the Fosse Ardeatine struggled between lightness 
and monumentality. After the liberation of Rome 
on 4 June 1944, the Allies were soon able to find 
the quarries where German troops assassinated 
335 Italians as a revenge after the events of Via 
Rassegna.37 The Roman City Council soon opened 
a competition to design a memorial in the area. 
Mario Fiorentino, Nello Aprile, Cino Calcaprina, and 
Aldo Cardelli (together with the sculptor Francesco 
Foccia) and the representatives of the Union of 
Young Architects, led by Giuseppe Perugini and the 
sculptor Mirko Basaldella, won the competition in 
1946. The result of the competition, the construction 
of the monument at the Fosse Ardeatine, combined 
raw monumentality with apparent material austerity 
for its architectural representation. A rough concrete 
monolith supported at only six points covered the 
336 gravestones beneath, leaving a thin slot of light 
between its massive volume and the ground. The 
ambiguity of the formal representation, between 
modernity and monumentality, suggests that the 
design could only become a piece of monumental 
solution within the physical possibilities in a given 
cultural framework. Structural technologies as well 
as final construction details reveal industrial and 
cultural identities. This semantic capability of detail 
in architectural expression became the discur-
sive axis for Italian postwar architecture, either in 
neorealist Roman architecture, or in the tendency 
to recover past artistic traditions in the northern 
areas of the country, a movement Paolo Portoghesi 
labelled Neoliberty Style.30 Unfortunately, fascist 
retaliations kept Giuseppe Pagano away from those 
developments.31 
4 - Reconstruction
Italy signed peace treaties with the winning coun-
tries in 1943, but it was not until 28 April 1945, 
that the shadow of Benito Mussolini was politically 
banished.32 After the war, it was difficult to distin-
guish between debris and urban settlements in the 
European landscape: a perfect tabula rasa where 
society had to be reconsidered. Furthermore, Italy 
faced a double misfortune: on the one hand, it was 
stultified by warfare; on the other, it had to negotiate 
the poisoned heritage of 21 years of fascist dictator-
ship. Italy was a divided country where supporters 
and detractors of the regime did not reconcile their 
harsh hostilities.
Finally, in 1946, the Italian Republic was erected 
as a modern state, and new legal, financial, and 
social agreements were belatedly established. 
The new constitution adopted in 1948 outlined the 
basic rules for reconstruction.33 The sponsorship of 
the European Recovery Plan, better known as the 
Marshall Plan, as well as multiple national recon-
struction programs, aimed initially to recover the 
agricultural sector as a way to counterbalance the 
enormous economic differences between the rural 
impoverished areas and the more prosperous cities, 
particularly those in the industrial north. Neverthe-
less, these efforts failed to curb the overwhelming 
migration towards urban centres. Reconstruction 
started with a pressing need for collective repre-
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ricerche promoted the study of housing prefabri-
cation, discussed at a round-table with the Scuola 
di architettura organica, a pedagogic institution 
depending on the A.P.A.O. and founded by Bruno 
Zevi after his educational exile in the United States. 
The magazine Metron emphasised those prefabri-
cated processes by showing the achievements in 
other geographies. Articles and images of techni-
cal systems, such as the experimental work by 
Conrad Wachsmann and Walter Gropius, were 
published with the hope to spread a technological 
seed for reconstruction on the Italian market. The 
efforts were partially compensated during the eighth 
Milan Triennale in 1947. The experimental complex 
QT8 by Piero Bottoni, one of the editors of Metron, 
brought up a question he had already formulated in 
1934. The aim was to design an urban area of 66 
hectares to accommodate services, facilities, and 
1300 dwellings of which 300 would use prefabri-
cation technologies. Housing was addressed in its 
multiple scales, searching for standardisation and 
prefabrication not only of its components but also of 
the whole process, namely in order to mass-produce 
the dwellings. But social needs and technical possi-
bilities were far from rendering suitable the industrial 
utopia for the Italian market. The low employment 
rates after World War II discouraged activities that 
reduced labour: the building industry was one of the 
main sectors held responsible for accommodating 
an unskilled labour force. Nor did the backward 
technological conditions help in that direction. The 
lack of economic enterprise and industrial ambi-
tion led to the rejection of designed prototypes as a 
compelling solution for reconstruction. The utopian 
technological hopes faced a material, social, and 
economic defeat.
Nonetheless, a more pragmatic solution was 
soon to solve this impasse. If standardisation was to 
be jettisoned by industrially short-sighted entrepre-
neurs, traditional techniques, already standardised 
not in production but in manufacture, were about 
to take the lead. After ten months of research and 
national unity if both losers and winners were able 
to feel a shared empathy in abstract terms without 
insisting on their differences. The void between the 
slab and the earth can be read precisely as the 
place for this encounter, since the refusal to touch 
the ground materially eliminates part of its monu-
mental weight. It is significant that the complexity 
of representation was materially loaded, and quite 
differently so in Rome than in Milan, particularly if 
we consider both memorials in the light of past and 
future events.
The Associazione per l’architettura organica 
(A.P.A.O.) was established in June 1945 in the 
Palazzo del Drago in Rome, and coordinated by an 
executive committee that had among its members 
Gino Calcaprina, Mario Fiorentino, and Bruno Zevi. 
In September 1945, the Roman magazine Metron, 
directed by Luigi Piccinato and Mario Ridolfi, 
published three declaration principles of the recently 
created Association. The second one defined what 
they understood as organic architecture:
Organic Architecture means an architecture for 
the man, modelled according to the human scale, 
according to the spiritual, psychological and material 
needs of the man associated with. Organic archi-
tecture is therefore, the antithesis of monumental 
architecture that promotes state myths.38
In order to fulfil the needs of an abstract and ideal 
popular man, it was necessary to disdain, during the 
reconstruction that was going to take place, all types 
of myths together with the ‘nationalist and autarchic 
resentments’ that fascism had lavishly formulated.39 
The ideological problem was that, quite often, the 
autarchic heritage and its austerity matched too 
well with the perceived ‘spiritual, psychological and 
material’ needs of the average Italian postwar immi-
grant.
Architects were about to lead the urban recon-
struction process. The Consiglio nazionale delle 
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national institution to manage Italian public housing 
policies, was created from the ashes of previous 
social housing organisations, the Istituto Case 
Populare (ICP, 1903) and the Istituto Autonomo 
per le Case Populari (IACP, 1909, renamed during 
the fascist years as Istituto Fascista Autonomo per 
le Case Populari). The great migration of workers 
towards industrial areas in the north and the wealth 
of those urban areas rendered urgent the need for 
coordination between housing policies and urban 
development, in order to balance the uneven popu-
lation distribution. Some of the most celebrated and 
memorable buildings from the period came out of 
the work by INA-Casa.
That same year, in 1949, Mario Ridolfi and 
Ludovico Quaroni started the design for the urban 
development Via Tiburtina in Rome, a housing 
project with a formal solution that resembled tradi-
tional rural constructions. The proposal organically 
articulated the different volumes by avoiding linear-
ity and repetition, rejecting the mass standardisation 
associated with modernist cities, and instead nour-
ished a picturesque, rural quality. This operational 
mode, which had its raison d’être in popular and 
rural values, and reinforced the concept of commu-
nity through the austerity of its aesthetic proposals, 
was the common ideological ground for architects 
and the population during the first decade after 
the war. The development of the village La Matera 
(southern Rome) in 1951 by Ludovico Quaroni, 
Federico Gorio, Michele Valori, Piero Maria Lugli 
and Luigi Agati, amongst others, became the 
most conspicuous example of this kind of attitude. 
Urbanism tried to deploy a kind, soft, and traditional 
solution to sociological and environmental issues. 
But perhaps better known was the design by Mario 
Ridolfi and Wolfgang Frankl for Viale Etiopia, also in 
Rome (1950-54). More committed to the modernist 
city than the previous ones, the qualities of the small 
details in the groundsels, the articulation of volumes, 
the reduction in the thickness of columns to accom-
modate prefabricated elements, and the harshness 
compilation, Mario Ridolfi published in 1946 the 
Manuale dell’architetto, a handbook financed by the 
Consiglio nazionale delle ricerche and The United 
States Information Service (U.S.I.S.) that managed 
to distribute 25,000 free issues among Italian archi-
tects and design professionals. The work was 
coordinated by Pierluigi Nervi, Bruno Zevi, Biagio 
Bongiovannini and Mario Ridolfi and edited by Gino 
Calcaprina, Aldo Cardelli and Mario Ridolfi himself. It 
was a response to ‘the vastness of the program’ that 
‘all the Italian buildings in the work of reconstruction’ 
were about to face.40 Unlike the comprehensive and 
celebrated Bauentwurfslehre published by Ernst 
Neufert in 1937, the Italian sequel revealed very little 
technological interest.41 Preceded by past attempts 
to systematise construction in Italy,42 the public 
presentation of the handbook in Metron magazine43 
distanced itself from Neufert’s work because of the 
complexity of translation of the German terminology, 
according to Ridolfi. But the handbook did not lack 
direct influences. The patronage biased the editors 
towards American methods, which explains, for 
instance, the presence of ‘balloon frame’ systems, 
appreciated by Sigfried Giedion but completely alien 
to Italian traditions.
The Handbook had 266 plates in eight main 
categories, which were meant to be completed with 
new solutions and details in later editions.44 Most 
remarkable is the absence, in dwellings, of space 
to accommodate appliances such as washing 
machines, used in developed countries, as Neufert 
had already acknowledged. This is not surprising 
though, if we take into account that according to an 
official 1939 census, as much as 21.6% of all the 
dwellings surveyed had no kitchen and over 40% 
had no drinking water and electric lighting.45 But 
despite the technological backwardness, or perhaps 
precisely because of it, the Handbook became a 
resounding success and welcome guide for postwar 
Italian architects. Soon, new national agreements 
for reconstruction were reached. In 1949, the Isti-
tuto Nazionale per l’Assicurazione, INA-Casa,46 a 
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more naive ones such as Miracolo a Milano (Vittorio 
de Sica, 1951) contributed to that aspect. But World 
War II did not stand for a fundamental gap in either 
architectural preoccupations or in formal architectural 
solutions. Certainly, the term realism was frequently 
used by those architects following fascist cultural 
intentions, as a populist, non-intellectual tool.49 
But predictably enough, postwar Italian architects 
found a way to deploy their professional skills and 
knowledge as representative of the national situa-
tion beyond material scarcity, ideological struggles, 
and utopian aspirations. An etiological analysis of 
buildings of that period would probably reveal their 
direct response to the spiritually decayed condition 
of a recently immigrated population, punished by 
the restrictions of the war, looking nostalgically at its 
rural past. But it also seems certain that their formal 
solutions were materially and ideologically affected 
by the historical, cultural, and economic context.
However, despite the excellent works of Italian 
modern architects and the intensity of their critical 
arguments, the technological ammunition that the 
country provided for the development of the modern 
movement before the 1950s was low-powered. 
This was due not only to its backward industrial 
conditions, but also to the role played by the fascist 
state in the economic management of the produc-
tive sectors and in its foreign policy. Those actions 
directly stained the architectural debate, politicising 
the use of materials and technology during the 
1930s and fertilising the ground for new design atti-
tudes after World War II. In Marxist terms, politics 
(superstructure) altered the mode of production 
(base) in order to fulfil military agendas. This modi-
fication generated a cultural conflict and response 
before World War II in both political sides of the 
architecture scene, and extended its influence to 
the reconstruction years. Autarky was the histori-
cal triggering agent that allowed austerity to play a 
dual role, playing in favour of official policies before 
World War II by seizing the possibilities of industrial 
and technological development in construction, 
of the proposals are usually understood as formal 
architectural responses to the social postwar milieu. 
The unworried use of decorative elements took 
advantage of the artisan aesthetic capacities within 
the tradition of those small laboratori, also inter-
preted as an exhilarating and compelling critique of 
the rigorous abstraction of the modern movement.
The Swiss scholar and architect Bruno Reichlin 
has stated recently that the parallel use of ‘rheto-
ric figures’ (such as social mimesis, spontaneity, 
or chance), are the conspicuous links to legitimise 
the borrowed label of neorealism in architecture.47 
Literary and cinematographic criticism identified 
redundant narrative and plot techniques in the 
cultural representations as reactions to the devas-
tation produced by warfare. Preoccupation with 
everyday social life, the use of language coming from 
the lower social strata, the display of the roughness 
of urban conditions, and the more or less explicit 
critique of moral habits and social attitudes were 
the common points around which the narrative was 
woven. But Italian architecture addressed some of 
those common concerns already before 1940, when 
it was still conditioned by autarchic policies. The 
cultural and economic milieu was reformulated after 
World War II by using the same traditional tools, 
giving birth to so-called neorealist architecture. It is 
not surprising then that some of the leading voices 
of this type of architecture were around Rome, close 
to the government’s power and influenced not only 
by its industrial policies and state interventions but 
also by architects’ reactions to them. 
Neorealism, as applied to architecture, is perhaps 
a hasty and overlooked term: as there is no clear 
precedent to identify a precise formal and ideologi-
cal style,48 we tend to think that recuperation of the 
past, the over-stimulated attention to popular taste 
as it was represented in the lower classes, and the 
use of traditional materials are a self-evident result 
of warfare. Perhaps the powerful images that films 
such as Germania anno Zero (Rossellini, 1948) or 
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